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Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought
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Dieser Artikel gilt, aufgrund seiner Grösse, beim Versand als 2 Artikel!
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| This book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant¿s Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgenstein¿s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant¿s requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein¿s idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world.
Aloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus¿ logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called ¿zero method¿, whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place.
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