Übersicht			Auf mobile öffnen

Lieferstatus:	Auf Bestellung (Lieferzeit unbekannt)
Veröffentlichung:	September 2012
Genre:	Wirtschaft / Recht
	C / Economic Theory / Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods / Economics and Finance / game theory / Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences / Management science / Philosophy of Mathematics / Political Science / Political science & theory / Public Economics / Public finance / Public finance & taxation / Quantitative Economics
ISBN:	9783642264139
EAN-Code:	9783642264139
Verlag:	Springer Nature EN
Einband:	Kartoniert
Sprache:	English
Serie:	Studies in Choice and Welfare
Dimensionen:	H 235 mm / B 155 mm / D
Gewicht:	759 gr
Seiten:	480
Illustration:	XVIII, 480 p. 49 illus., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen
Zus. Info:	Previously published in hardcover
Bewertung:	Titel bewerten / Meinung schreiben

Inhalt:

Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.