Übersicht			Auf mobile öffnen

Lieferstatus:	Auf Bestellung (Lieferzeit unbekannt)
Veröffentlichung:	September 2010
Genre:	Philosophie
	Applications of Mathematics / Applied mathematics / B / Econometrics / Econometrics & economic statistics / Economic Theory / Economic theory & philosophy / Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods / Engineering mathematics / game theory / Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences / Logic / Philosophy and science / Philosophy of Mathematics / Philosophy of Science / Philosophy# logic / Quantitative Economics / Religion and Philosophy mehr...
ISBN:	9781402099052
EAN-Code:	9781402099052
Verlag:	Springer EN
Einband:	Gebunden
Sprache:	English
Serie:	#346 - Synthese Library
Dimensionen:	H 235 mm / B 155 mm / D 20 mm
Gewicht:	1000 gr
Seiten:	178
Illustration:	XVIII, 178 p.
Zus. Info:	EUDR exemption - product or manufacturing materials placed on the market prior to 31.12.2025.
Bewertung:	Titel bewerten / Meinung schreiben

Inhalt:

Does game theory - the mathematical theory of strategic interaction - provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory - the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory - is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. De Bruin proves new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and he explores in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. He argues that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, De Bruin argues, has been rather successful in achieving this aim.