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Autor(en): 
  • Andjelika Eissing-Patenova
  • Acting under the "Guise of the Good". A critical analysis of the evaluation requirement for intentional agency 
     

    (Buch)
    Dieser Artikel gilt, aufgrund seiner Grösse, beim Versand als 2 Artikel!


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    Lieferstatus:   i.d.R. innert 7-14 Tagen versandfertig
    Veröffentlichung:  Mai 2019  
    Genre:  Philosophie 
    ISBN:  9783668903890 
    EAN-Code: 
    9783668903890 
    Verlag:  Grin Verlag 
    Einband:  Kartoniert  
    Sprache:  English  
    Dimensionen:  H 210 mm / B 148 mm / D 2 mm 
    Gewicht:  45 gr 
    Seiten:  20 
    Zus. Info:  Booklet 
    Bewertung: Titel bewerten / Meinung schreiben
    Inhalt:
    Essay from the year 2019 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: 1,00, University of Salzburg, language: English, abstract: Do we always perceive our actions as good? I defend the claim that an agent always perceives at least some good in his intentional action - often called the ¿guise of the good¿ (GG) thesis. In the philosophical debate, this goodness requirement has often been rejected by pointing to its problematic consequences. However, the source of such objections lies in the ambiguity and the imprecise use of the term ¿good¿. Thus, I will show how the presumed problems can be tackled. First, "intentional action" is specified and a distinction of two interpretations of the term ¿good¿ is given, which are relevant not only for the purpose of this paper, but also for gaining a clear view on the debate about the goodness requirement for intentional agency in general. Then, my main argument is presented and justified in detail, explaining for which understanding of ¿good¿ it is correct and for which it can obviously be deemed false. The main argument goes as follows: (P1): Intentional actions are actions done for motivating reasons by an agent A. (P2): If A has motivating reasons for his intentional action, he necessarily perceives at least some good in his action. (C): Therefore, A always perceives at least some good in his intentional action. This paper further includes a reconstruction of Kieran Setiya's objection to the GG thesis. Regarding his arguments, I will show in which way the problems highlighted can be handled by applying my argument. I conclude with a brief overview of the results, their practical implications and a demand for further interdisciplinary investigation, especially in psychology.

      



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